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Abstract—Database-driven Cognitive Radio Network (CRN)
has been proposed to replace the requirement of spectrum
sensing of terminal devices so that the operation of users is
simplified. However, location privacy issues introduce a big
challenge for securing database-driven CRN due to spectrum
availability information. The existing works consider either PU or
SU’s location privacy while not the both. In this study, we identify
a unified attack framework in which a curious user could infer
a target’s location based on the spectrum availability/utilization
information. Further, we propose a location privacy protection
mechanism, which allows both SU and PU to protect their
location privacy by adopting a series of countermeasures. The
location privacy and spectrum utility are the trade-off. In the
countermeasures of location privacy preserving spectrum query
process, both SU and database aim to maximize the location
privacy with constraints of spectrum utility. Thus, they can obtain
higher location privacy level with sacrifice of spectrum utility as
long as the spectrum utility meets the requirements. We evaluate
the unified attack and defence approaches based on simulation
and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed location privacy
preserving approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever increasing demand of spectrum for wireless
applications has inspired the emerging concept of CRN, which
is considered as a promising way to improve the utilization
of the scarce radio spectrum. In CRN, primary users (PUs)
own exclusive privilege to access the licensed spectrum while
unlicensed or secondary users (SUs) are allowed to oppor-
tunistically access the spectrum bands as long as they do not
cause any interference to PUs. Recently FCC has proposed
another approach, Database-driven CRN [1], in which an SU
can request Spectrum Availability Information (SAI) from
an authorized database instead of spectrum sensing. The SU
is required to submit its geo-location information and some
device parameters to the database. FCC has designated several
entities [2](e.g. Comsearch, Google Inc.) as TV bands database
administrators. Recently, two TV Bands database systems
designed by Koos Technical Services, Inc. and Telecordia
Technologies, Inc. have been approved by FCC for operation.
Database-driven CRN has a great advantage in enhancing the
efficiency of spectrum utilization, improving the accuracy of
available spectrum identification, and reducing the complexity
of terminal devices. However, as a variant of Location Based
Service (LBS), one of the major research challenges for
database-driven CRN is the privacy issues, especially in the
aspect of location privacy. The existing researches [3] [4]
have pointed out that both channel utilization information
and transmission power information can be exploited by the
adversary to infer the locations of SU or PU, respectively. This
will incur serious location privacy leaking for the SU or PU.
In recent years, location privacy is receiving an increasing
attention in both of academia and industrial community. From
SU’s point of view, the existing studies have shown that
location traces of users can leak information about the individ-
uals’ habits, interests, activities, and relationships [5]. What’s
more, loss of location privacy can expose users to unwanted
advertisements and location-based spams/scams, cause social
reputation or economic damage, and make them victims of
blackmail or even physical violence. From PU’s point of view,
location privacy issue is also of high importance, especially
considering the recent calls in the United States for spectrum
sharing of federal government including military with non-
government systems, in the 3.5 GHz band. Note that, 3.5 GHz
is currently used by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
for certain radar installations. Therefore, protection of location
privacy is highly desirable for both SU and PU.
There are several existing literatures [3] [4] [11] working
on location privacy issues in database-driven CRN, which
focus on privacy of either SU or PU. However, none of them
considers both. In this study, we first introduce a unified
location privacy attack framework in which an attacker can
exploit the spectrum availability/utilization to launch a location
inference attack towards a target SU or PU. We then introduce
a location privacy protection framework based on K-anonymity
technique [10], including approaches of spectrum query and
spectrum response as well as privacy preserving channel
selection.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
 We propose a unified framework for location privacy
inference attack on both SU and PU in database-
driven CRN. To thwart the problem of location privacy
leaking, we introduce a location privacy preserving
framework for available spectrum query and retrieval.
 We quantify the location privacy level and spec-
trum utility in the context of unified location privacy
preserving framework. Our analysis shows that the
location privacy level and spectrum utility of SU are
determined not only by its own actions but also the
choices of the database, and vice versa.
 We formulate the optimal strategies of the SU and
the database as optimization problems from the sys-
tem perspective. We conduct extensive evaluations to
demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed location
privacy preserving scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we present the background and the system model. In
section III, we introduce the unified attack scheme. In section
IV, we give the location privacy preserving scheme and analyse
the maximum location privacy which can be obtained by the
users. In section V, we evaluate the attacks and corresponding
solutions. Finally we conclude our work in section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM MODEL
A. Overview of Database-driven CRN
Database-driven CRN provides opportunistic spectrum ac-
cess service based on the location of SU. It mainly consists of
four categories of components: Database, Base Station (BS),
PU and SU. SAI is calculated and stored in the database based
on the knowledge of PUs and environmental parameters. BS
is a radio infrastructure that provides wireless interfaces and
connects the SU and the database. PU registers on the database
for exclusive privilege of spectrum utilization and doesn’t
necessarily interact with the SU. However, when PU changes
status, i.e., from on-line to off-line or from off-line to on-
line, it should inform the database to re-calculate the spectrum
availability. For the SU, prior to accessing the spectrum, it has
to communicate with the database to obtain SAI via internet
connection [6]. This process is known as spectrum availability
retrieval. Based on the SAI retrieved from the database, SU can
select an available channel and optionally send notification to
the database. The detailed operations of the database will be
described later in this section.
B. System Model
1) Basic Assumptions: In this article, we assume a region
R which is regulated by a database is divided into nn square
cells, in which the spectrum availability is relatively stable. The
cells are represented by cij , where i is the row index and j is
the column index. We assume that there are totally C channels
and C PUs, i.e., there is at most one PU operating on a channel.
The spectrum availability provided by the database is denoted
as ((ch1; P1; t1); (ch2; P2; t2); :::; (chk; Pk; tk)), where chi de-
notes the channel, Pi is the maximum allowable transmission
power of chi, and ti is the allowable operation duration on chi.
The maximum allowable transmission power is calculated by a
function P = h(), where  represents the information used to
calculate the spectrum availability including relative distance
between SU and PU [4]. The Maximum Transmission Power
(MTP) calculated by the database is divided into several levels.
Specifically, when the distance between SU and PU is less than
d0 which is the protection radius, SU is not allowed to transmit
on the PU’s channel. If the distance turns larger, the SU is
allowed to transmit at an increasing power level based on the
increasing distance till the largest transmission power Pmax is
achieved. Here, Pmax is the maximum allowed transmission
power in database-driven CRN regulated by FCC.
2) Database Query Process: According to the latest IETF
standard [6], a typical spectrum query process can be depicted
in detail as follows:
 Spectrum Query: SUi gets its geo-location via the
built-in positioning module and sends the query mes-
sage Que = (IDi; loci) to database. Here IDi is the
unique identifier of SUi and loci represents the located
cell of SUi. Note that, SU could query spectrum
availability for multi-cells in the vicinity.
 Spectrum Response: The database searches the chan-
nels which can be used at loci and then returns the
available channel set and corresponding MTP to SUi
in response message. We assume that the available
channel set contains all the available channels. One
unit of spectrum availability in the response message
is denoted as Res = (cij ; chk; Pk; tk).
 Spectrum Notification: SUi selects a channel and
then sends a notification message to the database.
Note that, the notification message is not required.
However, spectrum notification information is benefi-
cial to the database to manage the spectrum database
more efficiently. The notification message is denoted
as Not = (IDi; chk; Pk).
C. Attack Model
We assume that there might be some curious SUs in the
network and both the database and the SUs may be potential
attackers who are curious of each other’s location privacy. The
attacker’s goal is to infer the location of a target SU or PU
whose position is relatively fixed in a certain time duration.
The attacker is assumed to know the complete communication
contents between the SUs and the white space database.
We consider a general curious-but-honest model, which
means both of the SU and the database will never falsify the
data or query results maliciously. What’s more, the SU knows
how the database calculates SAI. We also assume the attacker
has sufficient computational resources such that it can perform
real-time analysis and run necessary algorithms to geo-locate
the target.
III. A UNIFIED LOCATION INFERENCE ATTACK IN
DATABASE-DRIVEN CRN
The database-driven CRN faces serious location privacy
issues due to the nature of LBS. On one hand, an SU must
submit accurate location to the database to obtain spectrum
availability. In the latest IETF standard, location of the SU
will be directly sent to the database. Once the database is
curious about the location privacy of the SU or it mishandles
the received location data, the SU will face serious security
threats. Even when the location blinding scheme [3] is adopted,
based on the spectrum notification messages which contain
selected channel and corresponding transmission power, loca-
tion privacy of the SU still leaks since the transmission power
can be translated to a spatial coverage. On the other hand,
the spectrum availability provided by the database can also be
translated to a spatial coverage of PU. A curious SU can collect
the SAI continuously to gradually reveal the actual location
of a specific PU. Existing works either focus on geo-locating
SU or geo-locating PU. However, none of them considers
the location privacy issues from both PU and SU’s sides. In
this section, we show two cases which incur location privacy
leaking in the spectrum query process and introduce a unified
location privacy attack which can potentially be exploited by
an attacker.
A. Two Identified Attacks of Location Privacy
Based on the MTP function, the allowable transmission
power is strongly correlated with the relative distance between
a specific SU and a specific PU. Specifically, each spectrum
unit (chk; Pk) reveals some distance information, i.e., the
power can be translated into a spatial coverage based on the
MTP function. We identify two cases which incur location
privacy leaking. In this article, duration of operation is not
taken into consideration.
1) Attack Based on Power Limitation: We know that the
MTP is discretely leveled so that the database could provide
spectrum utility more efficiently. In an ideal situation, we
assume the coverage of a limited transmission power can be
mapped into an annular area. Whenever a spectrum unit is
received by the SU or reported to the database, the SU or PU’s
location privacy leaks. Fig. 1(a) is an illustration of location
inference attack based on power limitation.
In Fig. 1(a), if an attacker receives an spectrum unit
(chk; Pk) in which Pk < Pmax, it is derived that the target is
located with high probability in an annular area which takes
the attacker itself as the center and d1; d2 as the internal radius
and external radius respectively. Both the database and an SU
can be the attacker.
2) Attack Based on Channel Switch: Another case which
incurs location privacy leaking is when an SU is in the
protection region of a specific PU. Here the protection region
is the area in which no SU is allowed to transmit. If the PU is
off-line and the SU selects to use the PU’s channel and then
the PU turns on-line, the SU has to switch to another channel.
Suppose that the protection region is a circle with radius d0.
Thus, the attacker knows that the target is in a circular area
which takes the attacker’s location as the center and d0 as the
radius with high probability. Fig. 1(b) illustrates the case.
In Fig. 1(b), when the PU turns from off-line to on-line,
the SU has to switch to another channel so that the target must
be located in a circular area C1=C2 with high probability.
B. The Unified Location Inference Attack Algorithm
The Unified Location Inference Attack is designed to infer
a specific target’s location based on the information in the spec-
trum query process. When the attacker is an SU, we suppose
that the target is a specific PU. When the SU is curious about
other PUs, it can similarly launch the attack scheme against
them. Without loss of the generality, we generally denote the
spectrum unit sequence which will be exploited in the attack
as S = ((loc1; ch1; P1); (loc2; ch2; P2); : : : ; (locn; chn; Pn)).
Note that, when the attacker is an SU, chi should be the
channel on which the target PU operates. If the database is the
attacker, there is no location information due to the location
blinding technique. Based on the spectrum availability and
spectrum usage information in the history, an attacker can
gradually reduce the possible distribution area of the target.
Suppose the covered area based on the center loci and the
transmission power Pi is denoted as Cov(loci; Pi) which
can be readily calculated, the detailed attack process can be
illustrated in Algorithm 1. In the attack implementation, we
set a n  n probability matrix for cells in R and update the
matrix following the Bayes Rule proposed in [4]. Once the
probability of a specific cell exceeds a pre-defined threshold
, we consider that the cell might be a candidate location of
the target.
Algorithm 1: Unified Location Inference Attack
Input: spectrum availability/notification sequence S.
possible prior knowledge of the target’s locations R0.
R0 = R if no prior knowledge.
Output: the target’s possible location set L.
Initialization: L = , , n n probability matrix
PR with all elements 12
for (power limitation or channel switch) do
M = number of cells in Cov(loci; Pi) \R0
for all cij in Cov(loci; Pi) \R0 do
prij =
prij
1  1M (1 prij)
end for
if prij   then
L = L [ cij
end if
end for
return: L
Based on Algorithm 1, the possible located region of the
target can be significantly reduced to a relatively small area,
which is demonstrated in section V.
IV. LOCATION PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN SPECTRUM
QUERY PROCESS
In database-driven CRN, an SU aims to enjoy efficient
spectrum utilization and the database also aims to provide
spectrum resource sharing among SUs and PUs. However,
sharing of spectrum resources may lead to breaches of location
privacy. In this section, we propose to exploit the K-Anonymity
technique to enhance the location privacy of both PUs and SUs.
A. Basic Solution
1) K-Spectrum Query: An SU is able to simultaneously
query for multi-cells around it. We propose that an SU who
is sensitive in location privacy queries SAI in a square cloak
region B with size K1K1 cells shown in Fig. 2(a), including
SU’s actual location. On one hand, the SU might be a relay
node and need to provide spectrum availability information
for other SUs who do not own the capacity of directly
communicating with the database [7]. On the other hand,
the actual location of the SU can be confused without any
location blinding technique. K1 and the position of B can be
determined in a user centric manner. Note that, R0 = B is
considered as the prior knowledge of the attacker so that the
SU will always set a relatively large K1 based on its own
security requirement. The SU will query SAI for the same
cloak B to avoid further location privacy leaking.
2) K-Anonymity Response: The database will honestly
provide SAI in all cells in B queried by the SU. Intuitively,
a PU’s location will be readily inferred based on the attack
scheme. Thus, we introduce K-anonymity technique to group
K2 PUs together as a virtual PU so as to enlarge the protection
(a) Attack with Limited Power (b) Attack with Channel Switch
Fig. 1: Location Inference Attacks
(a) K-Spectrum Query (b) K-Anonymity Response
Fig. 2: Location Privacy Preservation in Spectrum Retrieval
region of the PUs. Then the spectrum availability should be
re-calculated based on these virtual PUs.
To perform K-anonymity for PUs, we first group all the
PUs into d CK2 e groups, in which there are K2 PUs. Grouping
can be achieved by selecting the nearest K2   1 neighbours.
Then we have to find the minimum covering circle of each
group. Assume the center of the minimum covering circle is
X and the radius is RX , we can derive X and RX by solving
the following problem:
min
X
max
loci
d(loci; X) (1)
By following the MTP function introduced in [4], we can
get the updated MTP function after performing K-anonymity
as 2:
P =
8>><>>:
0 when d(X) < RX + d0
P1 when RX + d0 < d(X)  RX + d1
:::
Pmax when d(X) > RX + dn
(2)
Here, d(X) represents the relative distance between a
location and X .
K-anonymity based location obfuscation can certainly im-
proves the location privacy since it ensures the enlargement of
the protecting region of each PU. Fig. 2(b) is an example of
performing K-anonymity.
Each time the database receives a message querying for
multi-cells, it checks the PU’s location privacy leaking based
on the spectrum availability in the queried region. It deter-
mines whether to perform K-anonymity and the value of K2
according to the estimation of location privacy leaking based
on the attack algorithm.
3) Improved Channel Selection: The crucial step for an
SU to protect location privacy is selecting which channel to
use. The available channels received by an SU can be divided
into three cases which is analysed as below.
 (chk; Pmax) in all the cells: The PU operating on
chk might probably be off-line. SU will not select the
channel.
 (chk; Pmax) in some but not all cells: The SU knows
that the PU operating on chk is on-line but far away.
This channel is preferred to be used.
 (chk; P (< Pmax)): If there is no channel as in
the last case, SU selects a channel with the largest
transmission power as far as possible due to the largest
coverage of the power level.
B. Optimal Parameters
Based on the proposed location privacy preserving scheme,
we can stand on the point of system designer who knows the
global knowledge to optimize the parameters, based on which
the location privacy can be maximized while ensuring the
spectrum utility. We first define the metrics of spectrum utility
and location privacy and then devise parameter determination
programs to find out the optimal choices for both users.
1) Metrics of Spectrum Utility and Location Privacy:
 Spectrum Utility: Intuitively, the spectrum utility can
be represented by channel capacity. For simplicity,
assuming the capacity is constant as the frequency
varies in a channel band and the channel capacity is
constant in a specific cell, the capacity of chk can be
represented by Equation 3 [9].
Capk =Wklog2(1 + SINRk) (3)
Here, Wk is the bandwidth of chk and SINRk is the
Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) on chk.
SINRk is mainly determined by the transmission
power on chk, as well as path loss etc [9].
We define the spectrum utility of an SU as average
capacity of the used channels. Let CH and jCHj
denote the sequence and the number of the used
channels, the utility of the SU can be written as
Equation 4.
UtiSU =
1
jCHj
X
chk2CH
Capk (4)
When an SU queries spectrum availability information
for a cloak region B, spectrum utility of database
can be viewed as the cell-averaged channel capacity
provided. We denote the available channels as CHA.
Thus, the utility of database can be written as Equation
5.
UtiDB =
1
K21
X
c2B
X
chk2CHA
Capk (5)
Note that, an SU is mainly concerned about the utility
of used channels. However, the database, as a service
provider, focuses on the total provided available spec-
trum in the region.
 Location Privacy: According to the proposed attack
scheme, the target will be inferred to be in region L.
We follow the definition in [8] and quantify the user’s
location privacy as the expected error distance in the
attack. We assume the target is uniformly distributed
in L. Thus, the target is located in c 2 L with the
probability 1jLj and 0 in other cells, where jLj is the
number of cells in L. We can describe the attack result
as a probability density function A(loc0j), where  is
the information in spectrum query process and loc0
is the inferred location by the attacker. Thus, We can
compute the location privacy with Equation 6.
Pri =
X
loc02L
A(loc0j)d(loc; loc0) (6)
Here, loc and loc0 are the actual location and inferred
location of the target respectively. d(loc; loc0) is the
Euclidean distance between loc and loc0. When the
attacker is an SU, the attack result will be strongly
affected by the K1 and K2. Thus, we define the
privacy of database as Equation 7.
PriPU (loc; SAI(K1;K2))
=
X
loc02L
A(loc0jSAI(K1;K2))d(loc; loc0) (7)
When the attacker is the database, the attack result
mainly depends on the selected channel and corre-
sponding transmission power. The location privacy of
SU is shown in Equation 8.
PriSU (loc; S)
=
X
loc02L
A(loc0jS))d(loc; loc0) (8)
S is the sequence of channels which have been used
by the SU.
2) Parameter Determination: The obtained spectrum utility
and location privacy mainly lies on K2 and the selected chan-
nels, based on the locations of PUs and SUs are obfuscated.
According to the proposed attack algorithm, we can naturally
devise two parameter determination problems for an SU and
the database to work out the optimal strategy, based on which
the SU and the database can obtain maximum location privacy
while ensuring spectrum utility.
 Determine K2: The database sets a threshold of
minimum accepted spectrum utility DB and then
do the following maximization problem to determine
the optimal K2 based on the pre-determined K1 to
obtain the maximal location privacy while ensuring
the spectrum utility:
max
K2
PriPU (l; SAI(K1;K2)) (9)
subject to
UtiDB  DB (10)
 Determine chk: The SU sets a minimum accepted
threshold of spectrum utility SU and then do the
following maximization problem to determine the op-
timal chk while ensuring the spectrum utility:
max
chk
PriSU (l; S [ chk) (11)
subject to
UtiSU  SU (12)
Due to the small search space, we can launch exhaus-
tive searches to work out the optimal solution.
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We conduct experiments on an implementation platform
with Intel I5 CPU of 2.8GHz and 4GB memory. We evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed location privacy preserving
scheme under random parameter settings. Specificaly, e con-
sider a regulated region of 400  400 cells. There are 50
PUs/channels as well as 500 SUs randomly distributed in the
region. MTP is divided into 5 levels from 0 to 4(Pmax). In the
regulated region, PUs switch the status between on-line and
off-line randomly but not frequently. For simplicity, we use
the side length of a cell as the length unit for measuring the
location privacy while not the actual Euclidean distance.
We first conduct experiments of the unified attack against
the SUs and the PUs. The results of the attack is illustrated in
Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3(a), we illustrate the degradation of location
privacy of SUs as time goes. Location privacy is considered as
the averaged location privacy of all the SUs. We can see the
location privacy of SUs degrades with time. Finally, the SUs
can be geo-located in an small area with the average error of
less than 25 after all possible cases which might cause location
privacy leaking have occurred. Also, we show the degradation
of location privacy of PUs which is averaged from all the PUs
in Fig. 3(b). Due to the sufficient and fine-grained SAI, PUs
(a) SU (b) PU
Fig. 3: Location Privacy Leaking Based on Unified Location Inference Attack
(a) Samples of SU (b) Total of Database
Fig. 4: Location Privacy vs. Spectrum Utility
can be geo-located in an area with average error of less than
5.
We then demonstrate the efficiency of the optimal strate-
gies, comparing with random selections. Fig. 4 illustrates the
maximum achieved location privacy with certain constraints
of spectrum utility. In Fig. 4(a), we compare the location
privacy with and without optimal parameters. The samples of
SUs are picked out randomly. It is obvious that the maximum
location privacy is much higher with optimal parameters. Also,
the average error can reach to more than 60, much better
than without location privacy preserving scheme. In Fig. 4(b),
we illustrate the comparison of location privacy of PUs with
and without optimal strategy. We can see that the maximum
achieved location privacy with optimal parameters is equal to
that without optimal parameters. Also, the maximum location
privacy of PUs is much higher since the attack error can reach
to more than 200. This is due to the obfuscated protection
regions of PUs. Further, the actions of the SUs and the database
will affect each other. If the SU selects a larger K1, it will
obtain more spectrum availability which might be exploited to
launch location inference attack on PUs. The database will
set a larger K2 to protect location privacy, which reduces
the spectrum utility. Considering the same utility requirement,
optimized parameters can result in a much higher location
privacy level.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we introduce a unified location privacy
attack and corresponding countermeasures against the location
privacy leaking in database-driven CRN. It is shown that
the location privacy can be improved based on the proposed
scheme. However, the improvement is limited due to the basic
principle of database-driven CRN.
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